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NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & LIBERTY
POSSESSION AS A NATURAL RIGHT
Thomas W. Merrill*
What follows is, I hope, a tribute both to Friedrich Hayek, for
whom this lecture series is named, and Richard Epstein, who was
kind enough to invite me to give the lecture. Hayek has long been
an inspiration for his insights about the advantages of decentralized
decision making and the importance of information in understand-
ing design of institutions. Both are recurring themes in my own
work. Richard was my teacher at the University of Chicago Law
School and has been a guiding light ever since. His works on nui-
sance law, takings, and the public trust doctrine, among others,
have had a decisive influence on my thinking about property.
Most relevant to today's lecture, his essay entitled Possession as the
Root of Title1 was the first piece of scholarship that got me thinking
about the importance of possession, many years ago.
The lecture is divided into three roughly equal parts. The first
part addresses natural rights, and how the explosion of knowledge
currently taking place in genetics, neuroscience, and evolutionary
* Charles Evans Hughes Professor, Columbia Law School. This article is based on
the tenth annual Friedrich A. von Hayek Lecture given at New York University
School of Law. The research assistance of Samuel Kwak is gratefully acknowledged.
I Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979).
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biology may affect our thinking about natural rights. The second
part addresses possession, and asks whether perceptions of posses-
sion and respect for possession established by others may be uni-
versal features of human nature, conditioned if not determined by
our shared genetic endowment. The third part asks what implica-
tions this view of possession may have for property rights. I con-
clude with a thought about the much mooted question whether it is
possible to speak of a natural right to property.
I.
There are obviously many theories of natural rights. What
unites any conception of natural rights is the belief that these rights
that belong to all persons, by reason of their humanity. They are, if
you will, the universal rights of humankind. It is often said that
natural rights are pre-political. 2 This is true in the sense that natural
rights, being universal, exist at all times and places without regard
to whether they are recognized or enforced by any particular politi-
cal system. But natural rights would be of little value if they did not
have some traction in the political world. The practical value of rec-
ognizing something as a natural right is that this serves as a basis
for political and moral argument. The American Colonists justified
their rebellion from English rule on the basis of an appeal to natural
rights in the Declaration of Independence. 3 Nation states, including
the modern U.S., are occasionally moved to impose sanctions or
even engage in military action against other nation states or terror
groups based on appeals to stop their violation of natural rights. 4
2 E.g., THOMAS HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN 145-68 (Meridian Books, 1963) (1668).
3 "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights," DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE (1776).
4 For example, President Obama justified the initial American military support for
rebels seeking to overthrow Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi based in part on
violations of the Libyan peoples' "basic human rights." Nikki Sutton, President
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Natural rights, in other words, are invoked as a type of reason for
engaging in or desisting from political or individual action of one
type or another. We know, based on history, that these appeals can
be powerfully motivating.
Theories of natural rights come in many different flavors. Some
are grounded in theology or divine revelation.5 Others are ground-
ed in an imaginary social contract. 6 More recently, natural rights
tend to be called "human rights." 7 In this incarnation, natural rights
are grounded in the consensus views of international law scholars
about the minimal conditions required to sustain a "meaningful"
human existence. 8
I will focus on yet another tradition associated with natural
rights, this one going back at least to Aristotle.9 This is the tradition
that seeks to derive natural rights from an understanding of human
nature. The idea is that there are certain traits or attributes common
to all human beings, in all times and places, and that these common
attributes or traits supply the foundation for our understanding of
Obama on Libya: The future is in the Hands of its People, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Aug. 22,
2011, 5:20 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/08/22/president-obama-
libya-future-hands-its-people.
5 E.g., 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIA I-I Q. 94 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans. 1947).
6 Hobbs, Locke, and Rousseau are generally cited as seeking to derive conceptions
of natural right from an imagined social contract. See generally J.W. GOUGH, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT (Oxford U. Press, 1936). John Rawls is often regarded as a modern
social contractarian. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-92 (Harvard U. Press,
1971) (seeking to derive general principles of justice by reasoning about what per-
sons would agree to in the "original position" behind a veil of ignorance about what
station they would occupy in life).
7 THE UNITED NATIONS, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS Art. 3
(1948) ("Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person").
8 See CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM
(Oxford U. Press, 3d ed. 2014).
1 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics and Politics in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
(Richard McKeon ed. 1941). Although Aristotle is not usually classified as a natural
rights thinker, he sought to derive normative understandings of the virtuous life and
the best form of political organization based on an understanding of human nature.
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natural rights. In effect, any attempt to stamp out or suppress these
traits or attributes would be contrary to natural rights, because con-
trary to human nature.
Historically, arguments attempting to derive natural rights
from human nature have suffered from very limited knowledge
about whether or to what extent there is any common denominator
among all known human societies. The conception of human nature
was largely if not entirely based on armchair speculation.
This may change. We are in the midst of an extraordinary ex-
plosion in knowledge about the human species. This explosion is
being driven by rapid advances in a number of sciences -- most no-
tably genetics, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and experi-
mental psychology. 10 This research suggests that there is a signifi-
cant biological basis to a great deal of human behavior. There is no
claim that human behavior is strictly determined by biology. Cul-
ture clearly matters, and produces a great deal of diversity in hu-
man institutions. But evidence is mounting that human behavior is
significantly shaped by the human genome, such that all human
societies share certain commonalities, even if they exhibit tremen-
dous variation in the way these commonalities manifest themselves.
Let me offer a concrete example of what I am talking about.
Language is a feature common to all known human societies." It is
learned by children at an early age. The ability to use and compre-
hend language is centered in a particular part of the brain.12 This
capacity to learn languages almost certainly has a genetic basis.' 3
And all human languages share a common basic design. Neverthe-
10 See, e.g., EDWARD 0. WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE (Harvard U. Press, 2d ed.
2004); GREGORY COCHRAN & HENRY HARPENDING, THE 10,000 YEAR EXPLOSION: How
CIVILIZATION ACCELERATED HUMAN EVOLUTION (Basic Books, 2009); PAUL H. RUBIN,
DARWINIAN POLITICS 1-30 (2002).
11 STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT: How THE MIND CREATES LANGUAGE
(William Morrow, 1994).
2 Id. at 299-317.
13 Id. at 45-54.
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less it is unquestionably true that there are thousands of different
languages, and that the speakers of one language do not compre-
hend what is being said (or written) by those using a different lan-
guage. So it is fair to say that there is an ingrained human predispo-
sition to learn and communicate using language, but the particular
language of any human group will be a product of its history and
culture.
The purpose of this article is not to discuss genetics, neurology,
or evolutionary biology. I have no expertise that would give me any
authority to speak on these matters. Instead, I will offer some tenta-
tive thoughts about the potential implications of what, to an outsid-
er, appears to be a dramatic expansion in our collective knowledge
about the biological foundations of human behavior, and in particu-
lar what this may mean for arguments based on human rights.
I will mention what seem to me to be three potentially attractive
features of such a project, followed by two important qualifications.
The first positive implication is that a scientifically-grounded
understanding of human nature might supply a more secure foun-
dation for natural rights arguments. The traditional foundations for
natural rights arguments are, to be frank, flimsy. Divine revelation
may have worked at one time but it no longer commands wide-
spread assent. Arguments based on the social contract theory are
understood to be at most thought experiments. Modern discourse
about human rights rests largely on the views of a small number of
Western human rights activists, whose conception of the conditions
needed to sustain a meaningful life bears a suspicious resemblance
to the features of a modern Scandinavian social welfare state.
The emergence of vastly improved knowledge about the biolog-
ical roots of human nature, in contrast, holds forth the promise of
grounding natural rights in something much more solid - namely,
science. With the anticipated emergence of vastly expanded
knowledge about the biological foundations of human behavior,
grounded in replicable scientific studies, the argument from human
nature can put on a much more secure foundation than armchair
speculation. As scientists gradually map out behaviors that are
common to all human actors in all societies, it will become increas-
20151
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ingly plausible to describe the features of a universal human nature.
This in turn will allow us to argue that public policies or individual
actions that are opposed to these universal features of human na-
ture are contrary to natural right.
The second positive implication is that grounding natural rights
in human nature would be broadly supportive of human liberty. By
human liberty, I mean liberty in the Hayekian sense - freedom from
coercion. 14 Clearly, most persons will feel coerced if threats of force
are used to compel behavior inconsistent with human nature. Thus,
if we can identify a set of natural rights grounded in human nature,
these rights can be invoked to fend off action that most people
would regard as coercive. We can put the matter another way. In
order to induce people to engage in behavior contrary to human
nature, it is probably necessary to use coercion. Arguments that
would align government policy with the proclivities of human na-
ture should therefore reduce the need for coercion.
The third positive implication is that a set of natural rights
grounded in human nature should require little or no judicial inter-
vention in a well-functioning democracy. The argument here is
straightforward. If there is a set of natural rights grounded in uni-
versal proclivities of human nature, then a well-functioning democ-
racy will nearly always adopt policies consistent with these rights.
Policymakers who insist on adopting policies that run against the
grain of human nature will be voted out of office. Knowing this,
candidates will endorse only those policies broadly consistent with
human rights, in the sense of those conceptions of right that corre-
spond with human nature. This suggests that natural rights argu-
ments will be most value in seeking to shame authoritarian regimes
or terror groups into modifying their behavior, or perhaps to mobi-
lize persons to overthrow these regimes.
14 See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (U. of Chicago Press,
2011) (1960).
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Against these positive implications, I see at least two important
qualifications. The first can be called the is-ought problem.15 The
conception of human nature I envision is based on scientific inves-
tigation into the biological forces that condition the way humans
behave. This is an understanding of fact -- of the way people actual-
ly behave. Arguments from natural rights, in contrast, are necessari-
ly normative propositions. They set forth propositions about the
way people and institutions ought to behave. It is often said that
one cannot derive an ought from an is, that it would be a "category
mistake" to try to derive normative propositions, i.e., natural rights,
from studies of the biological foundations of human nature.16
This objection is sound, and it is important to stress that politi-
cal and moral philosophy must always rest on normative proposi-
tions other than the biological roots of human behavior. An evolu-
tionary biologist would say that our genetic endowment is based on
the behaviors that have had the most success in replicating them-
selves over the course of human evolution.17 These behaviors are
not necessarily the same as those that would maximize human hap-
piness, which is what a utilitarian theory, for example, would posit
as the touchstone for judging human institutions and behaviors
from a normative point of view. Genghis Khan may have been the
most successful human in history in term of spreading his genetic
material among biological descendants; but he did this largely by
raping large number of women in societies subjugated by his war-
riors. 8 I doubt very much if anyone today would want to offer this
15 DAVID HUME A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469-70 (Oxford Press 1968) (1739).
16 The point is that one cannot deductively derive normative propositions from
propositions of fact. It does not follow, however, that normative propositions are
purely "emotive" and hence are immune from reason or argument. See ALASTAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 6-34 (U. Notre Dame Press,
1981).
17 E.g., RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (Oxford U. Press 1989) (1976).
18 COCHRAN & HARPENDING, supra at 106; see Tatiana Zerjal et al., The Genetic Lega-
cy of the Mongols, 72 AM. J. HUM. GENET. 717 (2003) (claiming that about 8% of the
20151
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behavior as a moral or ethical ideal by which to judge either indi-
viduals or human institutions.
It does not follow, however, that we should insist on a norma-
tive framework for evaluating human conduct that ignores human
nature - or that adopts a wholly unrealistic theory of human nature.
Surely one test of any normative theory is its realism, the prospect
that if it were put into effect it would actually have some effect on
the way people behave. If our knowledge of human nature cannot
generate a theory of natural rights, it would nevertheless be folly to
insist on a theory of natural rights that proceeds in blissful igno-
rance of our expanding knowledge of human nature. Which, I am
afraid, is an all too fair characterization of some of the argument
today that proceeds under the banner of universal human rights.
The second troublesome issue, to be blunt, can be called the
Adolph Hitler problem. The Nazis believed in the superiority of
what they called the Aryan race, and they believed that this had a
biological basis.19 This led, of course, to terrible atrocities - the holo-
caust, the forced sterilization of the mentally impaired, eugenic ex-
periments on prisoners. We in the United States also bear a severe
burden of racism, in the form of a system of slavery that was con-
structed along racial lines, followed by years of Jim Crow laws and
enforced racial segregation. 20 These discriminations were also justi-
fied by racial theories, which again were assumed to have a biologi-
cal basis. Once Nazism was defeated at great cost, and once the
United States began to break free of Jim Crow laws and enforced
segregation in the 1960s - again after a very long and trying strug-
gle -- there has been an understandable tendency to banish any type
men in 16 populations throughout a large region of Asia are likely to be male-line
descendants of Genghis Kahn based on surveys of DNA variation).
19 CHRISTOPHER BROWNING, THE ORIGINS OF THE FINAL SOLUTION: THE EVOLUTION
OF NAZI JEWISH POLICY (Neb. U. Press., 2004).
20 See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS (Oxford U. Press,
2004).
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of social thought that might lead to a recurrence of these atrocities.
Any talk about a biological basis for human nature is therefore like-
ly to trigger sharply negative responses from those who are sensi-
tive to the dangers of racism in all its forms.
There are a number of responses to this concern. One is that the
racial theories of the Nazis and the segregationists were based on
quackery, not serious science. 21 The biological propositions trotted
out in support of the ideas of racial hierarchy are regarded today as
laughable. Such biological inquiry as existed was driven by a prior
commitment to racism, not the other way around.
A second point in response is that the recent discoveries about
human nature largely concern the commonalities among all human
beings, not their differences along racial or similar lines. The domi-
nant focus in the more recent explosion of research into biological
roots of human nature is on human faculties - like the ability to
learn language - that are shared by all human groups. The fact that
there may be biological differences among human groups is not
directly relevant to such a project, other than perhaps to inject a
note of caution about what can and cannot be claimed to be a hu-
man universal. 22
A third point in response is that it is futile to banish the recent
discoveries about the biological foundations of human nature from
discourse about political and moral theory. No doubt some - espe-
cially those most strongly committed to racial and social equality --
may wish these discoveries away, under the apprehension that any
acknowledgment of a biological basis for human behavior puts us
21 NICHOLAS WADE, A TROUBLESOME INHERITANCE: GENES, RACE, AND HUMAN
HISTORY 16-38 (Penguin Press, 2014).
22 This is not to suggest that there are not important genetic variations among
humans. For example, evidence has been developed suggesting there is a genetic
mutation associated with a propensity for certain types of hyper-aggressive or anti-
social behavior. WADE, supra note 21, at 53-57. My point is that these sorts on intra-
species differences, based perhaps on genetic mutation, are not relevant to develop-
ing a conception of human nature grounded in universal innate human proclivities.
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on a slippery slope to racism.23 But absent a repeal of the First
Amendment, it will be impossible to suppress all discussion about
the implications of the new science of human behavior for social
policy. 24 Suppression may work for a while in academic circles,
where groupthink holds sway today more than ever. Outside of
academia, however, we have seen a recent spate of books by jour-
nalists and academics in non-policy oriented fields -- like the New
York Times science writer Nicholas Wade25 and the Harvard psy-
chologist Steven Pinker26 -- who are willing to speculate about the
implications of the converging studies that point to a set of univer-
sal human behaviors grounded in biology. As the scientific research
continues to mount, and these sorts of ruminations proliferate, the
bastions of academic discourse about political and moral theory -
including law schools - will be forced to incorporate the new learn-
ing into their work. The objective should be not to censor the new
learning, but to incorporate it in a wise way.
II.
I turn now to possession. As a preliminary matter, it will be
useful to draw some distinctions in order to avoid unnecessary con-
fusion associated with the protean meanings of two words: posses-
sion and property.27 To illustrate the distinctions, I will make refer-
23 STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE
108- 20 (Penguin Books, 2002) (recounting hostility to the initial exposition of socio-
biology by E.O. Wilson and others).
24 See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (stating that "academic
freedom" is a "special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws
that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom").
25 WADE, supra note 21.
26 PINKER, supra note 23.
27 For further treatment of the distinction, see Thomas W. Merrill, Ownership and
Possession, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION (Yun-chien Chang ed., Cam-
bridge U. Press 2015).
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ence to certain situations involving the seats in a college football
stadium.
Possession is often used to refer to a fact, which we can call pos-
session-in-fact. We speak of possession in this sense when someone
is in actual control of an object, meaning she is in a position to ex-
clude others from the object. Suppose you enter a college football
stadium and approach seat 305 in an open seating section. Some-
one, call her Mary Sue, is sitting in seat 305. She is in possession of
the seat, in the sense of possession-in-fact.
Now suppose your turn to the next seat, number 306. There is
no one sitting in it, but you notice that a jacket has been draped
over the back of the seat, which obviously does not belong to Mary
Sue, because she is already wearing a jacket. You infer from these
facts that seat 306 has been claimed by someone else, who is tempo-
rarily absent but intends to return and occupy the seat. We can refer
to this as intended possession. Possession in fact has been estab-
lished by someone, but that person has temporarily relinquished
active control of the object, while intending to resume control in the
near future.
Now we can ask, what is likely to be your response to the cir-
cumstances presented by seats 305 and 306? If you are a normal,
minimally-socialized individual, you will move along to the next
available seat that is neither occupied by a person nor marked in
such a way as to indicate that a person has claimed it and intends to
return. You will not, almost assuredly, seek to grab Mary Sue and
throw her out of seat 305. Nor is it likely that you will grab the jack-
et draped over seat 306, fling it aside, and flop yourself down on
306. We can call the behavior you are exhibiting respect for posses-
sion established by others, or respect for possession for short.
So now we have three concepts to keep in mind in what fol-
lows: possession in fact; intended possession; and respect for pos-
session.
A fourth concept I will call property. Property is another term
of many meanings, but I will use it to refer to legally enforceable
claims on resources. Unlike possession, which can operate purely as
a social norm, property (as I define it) requires a functioning legal
2015]
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system.28 Property comes into play when you have certain claims on
resources that will be backed up by the state, usually in the form of
a system of courts. Suppose that in your quest for a seat in the sta-
dium you look up, and see a row of glistening skyboxes looming
above the open seating area you have been exploring. Through the
glass fronting the skyboxes, you can see people sitting in comforta-
ble chairs, conversing and eating hors d'vours as they wait for the
game to start. You know you have no business going up there to
look for a seat, because the seats in the sky boxes are property. You
are almost certainly unfamiliar with the details - whether they are
leased or owned or what. But you know you would have to get the
advance permission of the owner of one of the seats to sit there,
even if the seat is currently empty. If you attempted to occupy a
seat without permission, you could be in trouble, if only because a
security guard will throw you out.
The thesis I would like to propound is this: The possession con-
cepts - possession in fact, intended possession, and respect for pos-
session - are all part of human nature, in these sense that they are
proclivities or instincts that have a biological foundation and are
found in all human societies. Collectively, we can call these phe-
nomena the "possession instinct." Property, as I have defined it,
being an institution that does not exist without a legal system, is not
a universal feature of all human societies, for the obvious reasons
that not all human societies have legal systems. Nevertheless, as I
shall argue in the next part of the lecture, property systems draw
heavily upon, and derive much of their legitimacy and efficacy
from, mimicking or synchronizing with possession.
How do we know that there is a possession instinct? That is,
how do we know that the family of possession concepts has a bio-
logical foundation? We do not know this directly. No one has iden-
28 Merrill, supra note 27.
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tified a possession gene or collection of genes, and no one has de-
termined that part of the human brain is responsible for producing
respect for possession established by others. I would not be sur-
prised if we do develop this knowledge some day. But we are not
there yet, in significant part because geneticists and neuroscientists
have not been interested in looking for the biological roots of pos-
session. Instead, we must be content with indirect and circumstan-
tial evidence. In my view, the evidence is compelling. But you will
have to judge for yourself.
One type of circumstantial evidence is the ubiquity of posses-
sion-behavior in the world around us. I will not rehash the use of
possession in establishing rights to wild animals or claims to lost
property. These will be familiar to you from first year property, and
they support my thesis, but frankly they are a bit exotic from the
perspective of modern life. Consider instead how widespread pos-
session phenomena are, even in a world in which most things of
value are owned as property. Parking places for cars, either on the
street or in parking lots, are typically allocated by possession. Offic-
es and workstations in firms are allocated by possession. Spots on
the beach are allocated by possession. Coat racks and umbrella
stands operate on the principle of possession. Queuing - whether
for taxis, airline security checks, grocery store cashiers, or the
chance to buy a new iPhone -- is a type of allocation by possession.
Indeed, the seats in this auditorium were allocated by possession as
you filed in. This behavior is not unique to the United States or
Western culture, but can be found throughout the world.
Another observation: perceptions of possession, especially pos-
session in fact but also intended possession, typically occur rapidly
and automatically, without conscious thought. Perceptions of pos-
session exist in the cognitive realm that Daniel Kahneman calls Sys-
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tern 1 or thinking fast.29 When you entered this room you did not
have to devote any intellectual effort to perceiving which seats were
taken, which had been claimed by someone who intended to return,
and which were open. Your brain processed this information with-
out thinking about it. This feature of possession has been obscured
by property teachers, who love to dwell on a small number of cases
in which claims of possession are contested, such as the dispute be-
tween Pierson and Post over who was first to possess the fox. 30 Such
cases are fascinating, and we can learn important things about pos-
session by studying them. But the reality is that 99.9 percent of the
time, our perceptions of possession are made effortlessly and un-
consciously, and are not challenged by others who are processing
the same information. Indeed, this is how we successfully navigate
through daily life without significant conflict over the thousands of
items of value that cross our paths.
A third observation: the signs or symbols that mark something
as possessed or as something intended to be possessed undoubtedly
have a significant cultural element. As Bob Ellickson demonstrated
in his famous study of whaling communities, different communities
used different signs for establishing possession of a whale.31 Some
used harpoons attached by a line to the whaling boat, others used
bomb lances with colored flags attached to them. What I find re-
markable about these conventions, however, is how easily and rap-
idly they are learned by persons who enter into the community. No
one needs to go to school to learn the signs of possession. We pick
them up simply by observing how people behave around us. As
human interaction expands in a globalizing world, the signs quickly
29 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux,
2011).
30 Pierson v. Post, Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
31 Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the
Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83 (1989).
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become standardized around the world. My favorite example is
suitcases discharged at luggage carousels in airports. As air travel
has become increasingly common and has extended into all corners
of the world, the cultural signs of possession of a piece of luggage
have become the same everywhere. Thousands of people get off
airplanes at JFK every hour from all over the world, and each can
claim his or her luggage with virtually no dispute over who is enti-
tled to what, because the relevant signs of intended possession of
luggage are now universal.
Is there anything to say in the way of more solid evidence, of
the sort that would be credited by persons of a more scientific cast
of mind? Not a huge amount, unfortunately. But what there is con-
firms the conclusion I have just drawn based on common observa-
tion.
One type of evidence comes from anthropological studies of
preliterate human societies. Anthropologists have long debated
whether these societies recognize "property." Some say property is
universal, 32 others say it is not.33 I suspect this disagreement is
largely a product of ambiguity about what it means to label some-
thing property. What is not a matter of disagreement is that gift-
giving is widely if not universally observed in preliterate societies,
either informally within family groups or clans or on a more orga-
nized basis between larger territorially defined groups interacting
with other groups. 34 It takes only a moment's reflection to realize
that gift giving, whether organized or not, is not possible unless the
participants recognize the concept of possession and respect posses-
sion established by another. If I have an object, say an elaborately
32 E.g. DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS (McGraw Hill, 1991); Martin J. Bai-
ley, Approximate Optimality of Aboriginal Property Rights, 35 J. L. & ECON. 183 (1992).
33 E.g., MARSHALL SAHLINS, STONE AGE ECONOMICS (U. Chicago Press, 1972).
E.g., John F. Sherry, Gift Giving in Anthropological Perspective 10 J. CONSUMER RES.
157 (1983). The classical study is MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: FORMS AND FUNCTIONS
OF EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES (W.W. Norton & Co. 1990, W.H. Halls trans.)
(1950).
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carved knife, and I want to give it to you, then you must recognize
and respect that I have possession and I must recognize and respect
that I am transferring possession to you. Any human group that
recognizes gift-giving must therefore also recognize possession and
respect for possession.35 Since, accordingly to the anthropologists,
gift-giving is widespread if not universal in human communities, it
follows that possession and respect for possession must also be
widespread if not universal in these communities.
A second source that supports some kind of possession instinct
is found in the voluminous literature on the endowment effect. 36
These studies nearly all show that individuals ask more to give
something up, like a coffee mug, than they are willing to pay to ac-
quire it from some one else. The experimental psychologists who
first uncovered the endowment effect attributed it to what they
called "loss aversion": people experience the pain of loss more
acutely than the pleasure of gain.37 Thus, they demand more to give
up a mug than they are willing to pay to acquire one. Other exper-
imental psychologists disagreed, and attributed the endowment
effect to what they called "ownership." 38 In other words, the will-
ingness to pay/willingness to accept disparity comes about because
we grow attached to things that we regard as our own. As usual,
most of the studies do not distinguish clearly between possession
and property; in the typical experiment, the "endowment" includes
both, at least implicitly.
35 PHILIPPE ROCHAT, ORIGINS OF POSSESSION: OWNING AND SHARING IN
DEVELOPMENT 253 (Cambridge U. Press, 2014).
3 See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
1227 (2003) (providing an overview of studies).
37 E.g., Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980).
38 E.g., Carey k. Morewedge et al., Bad Riddance or Good Rubbish? Ownership and not
Loss Aversion Causes the Endowment Effect, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY 947
(2009).
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But one study in particular caught my eye. Joachen Reb and
Terry Connolly carried out experiments with business students in
Singapore expressly designed to differentiate between experimental
subjects given possession of an object but not ownership, and sub-
jects given ownership but not possession.39 The results were strik-
ing: "We found a significant effect of possession, but no significant
effect of factual ownership." 40 Unfortunately the authors, echoing
another strand in the psychological literature, attributed the influ-
ence of possession to what they called "psychological ownership."
The possibility that possession itself might be triggering the en-
dowment effect was evidently too simple to be given credence.
Nevertheless, I find the results here highly suggestive that percep-
tions of possession trigger changes in behavior in ways that are in-
grained in human psychology.
A third source that supports the existence of a possession in-
stinct consists of studies of infant behavior. Especially illuminating,
in my view, is the work of Lita Furby, based on studies of young
infants in Israel and the United States.41 Furby concluded that the
understanding of possession typically develops in the second year
of a child's life, before they develop any ability to speak. She hy-
pothesized that there are two components of infant behavior that
combine to produce this understanding. The first she called "ef-
fectance motivation," which is a drive to produce effects on the ex-
ternal environment, in other words, grabbing, touching, putting
into the mouth, etc. any and all sorts of objects with which the in-
fant comes into contract.42 The second component was the threat
that this exploratory behavior has for the infant and the surround-
39 Jochen Reb & Terry Connolly, Possession, Feelings of Ownership and the Endow-
ment Effect, 2 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 107 (2007).
40 Id. at 112.
41 Lita Furby, The Orgins and Early Development of Possessive Behavior, 2 POL.
PSYCHOL. 30 (1980). For a more recent summary of studies, offering a more Freudian
perspective, see ROCHAT, supra note 35, at 178-93.
42 Furby, supra note 41, at 36.
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ing environment. This results, as Furby puts it, with adults and old-
er siblings expending significant effort "to prevent the child from
interacting with many objects." 43 The result of this prolonged strug-
gle is that the child gradually learns which objects she can grab and
touch, and which ones are off limits; the distinction between mine
and not-mine.
What I find especially intriguing about this account is its com-
bination of biological and culturally-contingent elements. Furby
noted that "effectance motivation" is very likely a universal trait in
all human infants. It is hard-wired in human behavior. The fact that
limits are imposed on the infant's exploratory behavior also appears
to be universal, in the sense that "it is hard to imagine" a society in
which no such limits would exist. But, of course, the exact content
of the limits - where the line will be drawn between what can be
grabbed and grasped and what is off limits - will differ from one
culture to another. Thus, the concept of possession, in the sense of
the differentiation between objects that are mine and not mine, is
universal in all human societies. But the set of objects that are sub-
ject to claims of possession, and the markings that are used to dif-
ferentiate those objects from other things, will vary from one cul-
ture to another.
A final source is observational studies of animal behavior. Biol-
ogists have long observed a "territorial" instinct in a wide variety of
animal species.44 Less well known is that animals also show respect
for possession of objects by other members of the same species. Re-
spect for possession has been observed in wide variety of animals,
ranging from porpoises, to chimpanzees, to Western scrub jays. 45
Studies of primates are especially revealing, given their evolution-
ary proximity to humans. In one study involving macaques, re-
43 Furby, supra note 41, at 34.
44 E.g., ROBERT ARDREY, THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE (Atheneum Press, 1966).
45 DALE PETERSON, THE MORAL LIVES OF ANIMALS 156-72 (Bloomsbury Press,
2011).
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searchers observed that when a dominant primate attempted to
take a food tube from a subordinate primate in the presence of other
group members, "the subordinate will scream, drawing the atten-
tion of third parties, who frequently force the dominant individual
to desist."46 Reviewing a number of studies, Herbert Gintis reports
that "the taking of an object held by another individual is a rare
event in primate societies." 47 In other words, primates exhibit re-
spect for possession established by other primates. It is very unlike-
ly that this is a product of socialization into the norms of Chimpan-
zee culture. It must have a significant genetic foundation.
Collectively, these sources strongly suggest that possession and
respect for possession established by others appears to be a univer-
sal attribute of human psychology.48 In other words it is in our
genes, at least in part, having been selected out for its superior sur-
vival value over the millennia. This does not mean that the ability to,
identify possession and respect for possession is some kind of au-
tomatic reflex, like blinking in bright light. The set of objects eligible
for possession and the signs that communicate claims of possession
are clearly established by culture. But there is a strong predisposi-
tion toward recognizing and respecting possession, enough to make
judgments about possession virtually automatic, once one assimi-
lates the basic communicative signals of the culture. In this sense,
the possession instinct can be said to be part of human nature.
46 Id. at 7 (citing H. Kummer & M. Cords, Cues of Ownership in Long-tailed Ma-
caques, Maccaca Fasciularis, 42 ANIMAL BEHAVIOR 529 (1991)).
47 Herbert Gintis, The Evolution of Private Property 64 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1, 7
(2007).
48 Lee Ellis, On the Rudiments of Possessions and Property, 24 SOC. SCL INFO. 113, 121
(1985); see also ROCHAT, supra note 33, at 251 (concluding that despite cultural varia-
tions "possession as an experience of power within the group seems to be univer-
sal").
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III.
What then is the answer to the question implicit in the title of
this essay? Is possession a natural right? The answer has already
been intimated. The mere fact that the possession instinct is part of
human nature does not mean that there is a natural right to posses-
sion. One cannot leap directly from is to ought. However, once we
understand that possession and respect for possession are deeply
engrained in human nature, we can come to a better understanding
of the constraints that operate on any system of property. The fol-
lowing is by no means an exhaustive account of the implications,
but is meant to be suggestive only.
One implication concerns the recurring dream of Marxists and
various utopians to abolish private property. 49 Technically, it is pos-
sible to eliminate private property, as I have defined it, as a legally
enforceable right of individuals to control the use of particular re-
sources. One simply has to close the courthouse doors to those seek-
ing redress for things taken by others or to constrain seizures of
things by the state. It may be that some organized polities, such as
contemporary North Korea, have managed to realize such a state of
affairs.
But I think it is impossible to have an organized human society
in which respect for possession established by others has been erad-
icated. Descriptions of life in North Korea, for example, confirm
that individuals continue to have unique claims to items of personal
property like clothing and grooming instruments as well as to sim-
ple modes of transportation like bicycles and (for the affluent) tele-
vision sets.50 Whether or not these claims of possession would be
enforced by a court, they are clearly respected by others and by the
49 See, e.g., KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 84 (Har-
lan Davidson, 1955) (1848).
50 BARBARA DEMICK, NOTHING TO ENVY: ORDINARY LIVES IN NORTH KOREA 14, 33,
77 (Spiegel & Grau, 2009).
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government. The same was apparently true in Soviet Russia, Cas-
tro's Cuba, and Mao's China, even during the most ruthless years of
official hostility to private property. It is not possible to dismiss the-
se vestiges of "possessive individualism" as a mere function of the
administrative costs of collectivizing the control over shoes and
toothbrushes. Respect for possession emerges spontaneously and
persists with respect to things closely associated with persons, and
a government committed to stamping out these proclivities would
have a herculean task beyond the capacities of the even the most
fanatical and ruthless regime.
If there are constraints on how far modern societies can go in
eradicating property, because of the possession instinct, there are
also limits on how far societies can go in extending the protections
associated with property to resources that have no tangible dimen-
sion, and hence cannot be possessed in any ordinary sense. Consid-
er in this regard the vexed status of intellectual property in a world
in which intellectual goods are distributed by digital signals. The
property right in intellectual property is the intangible right to pre-
vent the use or the copying of particular intellectual goods. Being
intangible, it is not possible, strictly speaking, to possess an intellec-
tual property right. This suggests that IP rights will suffer from
congenital weakness relative to possessory property rights, such as
land and chattels. Specifically, IP rights lack the intuitive force asso-
ciated with possessory rights, which lends legitimacy and facilitates
enforcement of possessory property rights.
Historically, IP rights were able to overcome this weakness, at
least to a significant degree, because IP rights were embodied in
tangible things, which in turn could draw upon the intuitive force
of possession. Thus, patents were embodied in particular machines
or chemicals, and if one attempted to create an equivalent machine
or chemical by reverse engineering without a license from the pa-
tent holder one was guilty of infringement. It was fairly easy for
people involved in manufacturing to think that the patented ma-
chine or chemical stamped with a patent number was a "thing"
which they could not use or copy without permission. Similarly,
copyrights were embodied in particular writings, like books or
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sheet music, again stamped with a copyright notation. If one at-
tempted to copy the book or the sheet music, and distribute it with-
out a license, one was guilty of infringement.
Once intellectual property took on the form of bits of digital in-
formation, the association between IP and possessory rights became
much more attenuated, if it did not disappear altogether. This ex-
plains the modern phenomenon of mass violation of intellectual
property rights embodied in digital material, especially copyrights.
Young adults who would not think of stealing a book from a
bookstore or a videotape from a video store apparently think there
is nothing wrong with downloading pirated movies and TV shows
from the internet. According to a recent New York Times article, over
10 billion movies, television shows and games were downloaded in
the second quarter of 2014, and only about 6 percent of these down-
loads were legal.5 1 A recent survey by scholars associated with Co-
lumbia University found that 70 percent of young adults between
18 and 29 have copied or downloaded digital material without pay-
ing license fees, and almost 30 percent get most of their digital ma-
terial that way.52 According to the Times, "[tihe pervasive cultural
norm, especially among younger people, is that illegal download-
ing, at least when it involves material from big corporations, is no
big deal." 53
No doubt there are multiple reasons for the mass indifference to
internet pirating. But a key factor, in my view, is that digital down-
loads are completely severed from any perception that one is inter-
fering with possession established by another. Digitalized IP rights
51 Jenna Wortham, The Unrepentant Bootlegger, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2014, at B1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/O9/28/ technology/ the-unrepentant-
bootlegger.html?_r=0.
52 JOE KARAGANIS & LENNART RENKEMA, COPY CULTURE IN THE US AND GERMANY
5 (The American Assembly, 2013).
13 Wortham, supra note 5 1.
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therefore suffer from a legitimacy gap relative to rights that draw
on the natural respect afforded to possession.
The possession instinct can help explain other longstanding
puzzles in the law of property. One concerns the difference in the
nature of the protection afforded to property by the actions in tres-
pass and nuisance. 54 An intentional trespass is subject to a strict
and unyielding doctrine that makes no inquiry into the reasonable-
ness of the defendant's action, requires no proof of actual harm and
readily translates into injunctive relief. An intentional nuisance, by
contrast, is governed by a situation-specific balancing test that gen-
erates liability only if the intrusion is unreasonable, requires a
showing of substantial harm and often remits the successful plain-
tiff to a recovery of damages rather than injunctive relief.
Once we grasp the systemic importance of the possession in-
stinct, however, there is a simple explanation for the disjunction.
Trespass entails an invasion of property by objects sufficiently large
to deprive the owner of possession of a portion of the property.
Given the widespread respect for possession established by others,
an intentional trespass represents a fundamental disruption of the
normative order on which property law is built. In contrast, nui-
sance entails irritants that diminish the use and enjoyment of prop-
erty, but do not deprive the owner of possession. Nuisance impli-
cates only the need for accommodation of conflicting interests be-
tween neighbors regarding the proper use of property. Not surpris-
ingly, the law drifts toward a balancing test and a reasonableness
inquiry because nuisance elicits more complex response from the
public.55
-4 Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W. 2d 215 (Mich. App. 1999); see gen-
erally Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property
Rights, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1985).
55 Compare RESTATEMENT OF TORTs § 157 (trespass liability) with id. § 826 (nuisance
liability).
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The law of takings reflects a similar divide. One of the great
puzzles for an economist is the intense hostility of the public to tak-
ings by eminent domain, as reflected in the backlash to the Kelo de-
cision,56 combined with the relative indifference to regulatory tak-
ings as reflected in restrictive zoning laws and the like.57 Econo-
mists note that takings by eminent domain are always compen-
sated, whereas regulatory takings almost always go uncompen-
sated. Consequently, eminent domain should result in relatively
efficient decisions about when and what to take because the power
is constrained by the requirement of paying the opportunity of cost
of the property taken. Restrictive land use regulations, in contrast,
often impose severe costs on owners, which regulators have little
incentive to take into account in their decision making. Judging by
the hoopla over Kelo,58 however, the public is more exercised by
invocations of eminent domain than it is by uncompensated land
use regulations.
The disjunction in attitudes is again explainable in terms of pos-
session. Takings by eminent domain deprive owners of possession
against their will. Zoning and other types of land use regulation
leave possession intact, and affect only the permissible uses of the
land. The typical "ordinary observer" of these different types of
government action regards the deprivation of possession as a much
more significant intrusion upon owner prerogatives, even if the tak-
ing will be accompanied by compensation.59 Here, we can see how
public sentiment, driven by the possession instinct, can cause public
policy to diverge from what a purely utilitarian analysis might sug-
gest.
- Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
57 See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
POLITICS 67-77 (Harvard Press 1995).
- See Ilya Sornin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93
MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009).
59 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 15-20 (Yale
Press 1977) (characterizing the perceptions of the "ordinary observer").
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Another mystery, again from constitutional law, involves the
role of notice of future government regulation in the law of regula-
tory takings. The general question is whether a property owner who
has notice of a regulatory scheme at the time he or she acquires
property is barred from challenging the scheme as a taking once the
regulation bites. The Supreme Court has behaved quite inconsist-
ently in the face of these claims. It has held that notice of future
regulation qualifies contract rights, 6° security interests, 61 intellectual
property rights 62 and government entitlement programs. 63 When
faced with notice of future regulation of real property, however, the
Court has balked at qualifying rights, stating that the state may not
"put an expiration date on the Takings Clause" by "putting so po-
tent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle." 64 Some might
chalk this up to a fetishistic attachment to property in land. But the
inconsistency dissolves, once we understand that rights grounded
in possession are likely to be more durably rooted in human nature.
All the rights the Court has suggested can be prospectively extin-
guished by notice are intangible, i.e., rights incapable of possession.
So far, the Court has been unwilling to allow notice to defeat claims
involving possessory rights.
A final illustration is the law of adverse possession. No matter
how committed the legal system may be to the formal title registra-
tion, every modern legal system recognizes an exception for posses-
60 Ogden v. Saunders, 27 U.S. 213 (1827) (obligation of contract may be modified
prospectively through the creation of a state insolvency proceeding applicable to
future contracts).
61 United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982) (semble) (prospec-
tive elimination of security interest in property exempt from discharge in bankruptcy
is permissible).
62 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (notice that government will
disclose trade secrets filed with it in the future eliminates any claim under the Tak-
ings Clause).
63 Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41
(1986) (prospective elimination of Social Security benefits is permissible).
64 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001).
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sory claims that have been openly and consistently maintained in
opposition to the registered title.65 When push comes to shove, pos-
session trumps property. There are various utilitarian explanations
for this,66 but the possession instinct also tells us that we should not
be surprised. Public sentiment will tend to favor a possessor who
has established open, notorious, and continuous control over some
thing relative to an owner who has abandoned or has never taken
up possession. With sufficient passage of time, the law bends to this
force by giving the possessor a title superior to that of the owner.
The possession instinct is not merely a constraint on what socie-
ties can do in the way of structuring the institution of property. If
properly harnessed, the possession instinct is also a powerful force
that can make property rights more useful and secure. The most
general strategy here is to design property rights so that they mimic
the key features of possession. Possession-in-fact entails exclusion,
and intended possession entails an intention to exclude in the fu-
ture. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that property rights
always entail as one of their features the right to exclude others
from the owned object.67 Property - at least property that is capable
of being possessed -- entails the legal right to determine who will be
in possession. There are of course other important attributes of
property, such as the right to include others, to use, to consume, to
transfer, and so forth. But none of these appears to be a necessary
condition of recognizing something as property.
Why is the right to exclude an ever-present feature of property,
as opposed to something else, like the right to use or the right to be
included? The possession instinct can supply the answer.68 Because
65 BENITO ARRUNADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF IMPERSONAL EXCHANGE 56
(University of Chicago 2012).
66 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession,
79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1123, 1128-38 (1985).
67 Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998).
6 Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude I, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER
PROPERTY RIGHTS CONF. J. 1, 13-21 (2014).
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possession and respect for possession are phenomena that dominate
our interactions with valued objects in everyday life, property and
possession must remain closely synchronized. One could say that
property has to mimic possession, so as to allow the institution of
property to mesh with the instinct that organizes most of our daily
interaction with things of value. Given that possession is grounded
in exclusion- either the fact of exclusion or the perception that
someone has the intention to exclude others from the thing - prop-
erty must also be anchored to exclusion, in this case the legal right
to exclude. If possession were grounded in one concept (exclusion),
and property were grounded in another concept (such as need, or
desert, or whatever), there would be too much cognitive dissonance
for the system to bear.
To drill down a bit deeper, harmonizing the institution of prop-
erty with the possession instinct has three powerful advantages.
They can be summarized in three terms: legitimacy, information
costs, and transaction costs.
First, by constructing a system of property on the foundation of
possession we immeasurably enhance the legitimacy of property
rights. If, as I have argued, perceptions of possession and respect
for possession established by others are universal features of human
societies, then a system of property rights that is keyed to posses-
sion will capitalize on these features of human nature. If property is
seen as being linked to possession, property will likely be regarded
as highly legitimate. We can rely primarily on everyday morality
and social norms to protect property rights. 69 Intervention by the
police and the courts will be episodic, and when it occurs it will
likely reinforce the everyday morality and the social norms that sus-
tain the institution on a day-to-day basis. If property were based on
something else - social class or connections to the right leaders or
69 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 849, 1852-58 (2007).
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even moral desert - it would be much less legitimate in the eyes of
others.
Second, as mentioned earlier, perceptions of possession are,
99.9 percent of the time, automatic and intuitive. Because the pos-
session instinct is a universal feature of human beings, very young
children and strangers can learn to process information about pos-
session without any conscious intellectual effort. This means the
information costs of sorting out objects of value according to per-
ceptions of possession are extraordinarily low. Insofar as the system
of property draws on possession as a proxy for ownership - which
is does in many critical contexts - then the information costs associ-
ated with having a system of property are correspondingly re-
duced.
Third, transaction costs. Here, I would point out that the vast
majority of transactions that take place in modern society use pos-
session as a proxy for ownership. When you buy groceries from a
market, or clothing from a store, or a bottle of water from a street
vendor, technically ownership is being transferred from seller to
buyer. But no one in their right mind would do a title search before
engaging in such a transaction. The costs would be prohibitive rela-
tive to the value of the exchange. Fortunately, we can rely on the
fact that the vendor has possession -- both of the objects being sold
and of the spot of ground on which the vending operation is located
- as proxies for title. And nearly all of the time, this is good enough.
As we turn to transactions in more expensive and durable goods --
like real estate, airplanes, and cars -- the calculus changes, and title
searching comes into the picture. 70 But fortunately, possession is
available as a proxy for title most of the time, which vastly reduces
the costs of transacting, and hence increases the efficiency of ex-
change.
70 Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of
Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299 (1984).
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IV.
I will conclude with a brief thought about one of the most
longstanding and intractable debates in property theory, namely
whether property is a natural right. Locke and his followers like
Robert Nozick argue for the natural rights position. 71 Property ex-
ists in a state of nature based on acts of first possession. The state
and its law are then created for the purpose of protecting property.
In opposition, Bentham and his many followers argue for the posi-
tive rights position. 72 Property is a basis of expectation grounded in
law. Take away law and there can be no property.
The foregoing account of the possession instinct may provide at
least a partial solution to this perennial debate. Respect for posses-
sion, as we have seen, is grounded in innate human proclivities, as
particularized by social norms and customs. Possession and respect
for possession exist in preliterate societies and in social contexts
where individuals have no ownership rights. In this sense, posses-
sion is "pre-political." Property, in contrast, exists only in the con-
text of a state with formal legal institutions that can authoritatively
resolve title disputes. Ownership is definitely "post-political." As
we have seen, however, property law has been shaped by posses-
sion in many ways, and is critically dependent on possession, with
its superior legitimacy, lower information costs, and transaction-
cost reducing properties. Property is thus a positive right, but inso-
far as it builds on and relies on possession, is grounded in a univer-
sal pre-political norm.
One implication of this characterization of the issue is that
Locke may well have been right, insofar as he was talking about
possession. To be sure, one would not want to declare that posses-
71 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, SECOND TREATISE 285-302 (Peter
Laslett ed., 1988) (1690); ROBERT NOzICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 149-64
(1974).
72 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 113 (C.K. Ogden ed. 1931)
(1802).
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sion is always a natural right. This would entail giving thieves good
title to whatever they can pilfer, not to mention allowing unlimited
killing of whales. But under the strict limiting conditions that Locke
prescribed for thinking about the issue - no prior possession of the
item by another, enough and as good left for others, and no waste
73
- it may well be appropriate to speak of possession as a natural
right.
Bentham, on the other hand, was undoubtedly right insofar as
he was talking about rights to resources enforced by the police and
the courts. These can only exists as positive rights, created and en-
forced by the state. Where Bentham and his followers have gone
wrong is to imagine that property, being a positive right, can be
created or abolished, molded and remolded, in any conceivable
fashion suggested by considerations of social utility. The possession
instinct, which is part of human nature, cannot be legislated away.
It will always exist, in the background, imposing powerful con-
straints on how far any system of property can deviate from what is
acceptable to humankind.
73 LOCKE, supra note 71, at 288 (labor confers a right to exclusive possession "at
least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.").
